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Abstract: There is limited empirical evidence on whether cash transfers to poor pregnant women 
improve children’s birth outcomes and potentially help weaken the cycle of intergenerational 
poverty. Using a unique array of program and social security administrative micro-data 
matched to longitudinal vital statistics in Uruguay, we estimate that participation in a generous 
social assistance program led to a sizeable reduction in the incidence of low birthweight. The 
effect is due to faster intrauterine growth rather than longer gestational length. Our findings are 
consistent with improved maternal nutrition during pregnancy being a key driver of improved 
birthweight. 
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This paper estimates the impact of in utero exposure to a social assistance 
program – the Uruguayan Plan de Atención Nacional a la Emergencia Social 
(PANES) – on children’s birth outcomes, and investigates some of the underlying 
behavioral mechanisms using a rich assortment of matched micro-data from vital 
statistics, social security and program administrative records. We exploit the fact 
that program assignment depended on a discontinuous function of a baseline 
predicted income score. We compare the incidence of low birthweight among 
infants of “barely eligible” and “barely ineligible” mothers before and after they 
entered the PANES program using a regression discontinuity approach that we 
combine with a difference-in-differences strategy to improve statistical precision.  
Although there is growing evidence that improvements in mother’s 
education lead to improvements in children’s birth outcomes, possibly through an 
increase in mother’s permanent income (Currie and Moretti 2003), there is less 
evidence that temporary interventions in the form of cash transfers to pregnant 
women significantly affect birth outcomes. Almond and Currie (2011a) conclude 
that “research has shown little evidence of positive effects of cash welfare on 
children”. This is particularly relevant from the perspective of policymakers if, as 
many argue, poor birth outcomes have long-lasting adverse impacts on 
individuals and society. 
Children of poor parents are at disproportionate risk of ending up in 
poverty themselves (Black and Devereux 2011). This is partly due to their poorer 
health, which both affects the acquisition of other dimensions of human capital 
(Miguel and Kremer 2004) and can directly impact economic outcomes later in 
life (Case, Fertig and Paxson 2005). Early interventions, and in particular those in 
utero, have the potential to be particularly cost-effective since their benefits 
extend over a longer time span, due to potential complementarities with other 
inputs, and the possibility that they permanently affect the path of individual 
physiological and cognitive development (Heckman 2000). Improvements in 
  
 
 
 
household financial resources brought about by social assistance can, in principle, 
increase children’s wellbeing through better nutrition, sanitation and health care 
(Case 2000, Case, Lubotsky and Paxson 2005).  
However, there is evidence that offsetting behavioral responses might also 
be at work. In addition to negative parental labor supply responses to welfare 
transfers (Moffitt 2002, Hoynes 1996, Hoynes and Schanzenbach 2011), poor 
parents might favor current consumption over investments in their children’s 
human capital due to myopia or self-control problems, imperfect altruism, 
intergenerational commitment problems, or limited information about the 
technology of, or returns to, investment in their children’s human capital (Jensen 
2010). Social assistance could even potentially increase the consumption of 
certain “bads” (such as cigarettes or alcohol) that negatively affect birth 
outcomes, could increase the fraction of children born in poor health by creating 
incentives for poor women to boost their fertility (Currie and Moretti 2008), or 
could perhaps lead to family break-up (Moffitt 1998), with potentially negative 
effects on children. 
Ultimately, whether cash transfers to poor parents affect children’s early 
health outcomes positively, negatively or at all remains an open empirical 
question. In this paper, we focus on the effect of cash social assistance during 
pregnancy on a measure of early life health: low birthweight. The World Health 
Organization defines low birth weight as weight under 2,500 g (roughly 5.5 
pounds). This is a widely available measure, and medical research shows that it is 
a major predictor of both short-run child morbidity and mortality as well as adult 
health outcomes (Kramer 1987, 2003, Gluckman and Hanson 2004, 2005, 
Almond, Chay and Lee 2005), and even the birthweight of the next generation 
(Painter 2008). Research in economics shows that birthweight also affects life 
outcomes beyond health, such as IQ, education and earnings (Almond and Currie 
2011a, 2011b, Behrman and Rosenzweig 2004, Black, Devereux and Salvanes 
  
 
 
 
2007, Currie and Hyson 1999, Currie and Moretti 2007, Currie 2009), although 
others claim that the costs of low birthweight might be overstated.1 
With a few notable exceptions, evidence on the effect of in utero exposure 
to cash welfare transfers on birth outcomes, and in particular on low birthweight, 
is limited. This paucity of credible evidence results from the lack of both adequate 
micro-data as well as convincing sources of exogenous variation in transfers. The 
main channels of impact are also poorly understood, again in part due to data 
limitations.  
This paper contributes to filling these gaps. Beyond specifically focusing 
on a program whose major component was a cash transfer, one of the main 
contributions of this paper lies in the dataset that we have assembled and the 
opportunities that it offers for econometric identification of both program effects 
and channels. We link multiple sources of administrative micro-data to build a 
monthly longitudinal dataset spanning five years of individual women’s 
pregnancy and birth outcomes, as well the circumstances surrounding these 
events. In particular, we have information on socio-demographic characteristics, 
labor market outcomes, and the receipt of program transfers and other public 
benefits for the universe of female program applicants of childbearing age, 
approximately 185,000 women and 70,000 births.2 
To our knowledge, this paper represents the first effort to link the universe 
of vital statistics data to social assistance transfer program data at the level of 
individual beneficiaries. In contrast, most existing studies (reviewed below) use 
either survey data with self-reported birth outcomes, program receipt and income, 
or rely on geographically aggregated data. Because of the aggregate nature of the 
                                                          
1 Almond, Chay and Lee (2005) find modest excess hospitalization costs associated with low birthweight (as opposed to 
very low birthweight) children, and argue that these effects are overstated in OLS regressions, while Royer (2009) finds 
modest effects of birthweight on adult outcomes including education. 
2 Although we use the universe of births for the country, note that Uruguay has roughly the same population and annual 
births as Connecticut, a medium sized U.S. state. 
  
 
 
 
data used in many related studies, identification of program effects also typically 
relies on differential variation in program eligibility across geographic areas or 
demographic groups. An obvious drawback of such approaches is the difficulty of 
ruling out unobserved trends in outcomes that are correlated with program 
eligibility rates, possibly inducing omitted variable bias. In contrast, we exploit 
individual-level variation in eligibility generated by exact rules given that 
program assignment was a discontinuous function of baseline characteristics. This 
allows us to recover estimates of program impact based on a comparison of 
changes in outcomes between “barely eligible” and “barely ineligible” mothers, 
i.e. mothers who were most likely to be nearly identical to each other except for 
their program participation.  
To preview our results, we find that the substantial increase in household 
income generated by the program (approximately 25 percent on average) led to a 
drop in the incidence of low birthweight of 19 to 25 percent (i.e., 1.9 to 2.4 
percentage points on baseline incidence of 10 percent).  In two years, the program 
closed the pre-existing gap in low birthweight incidence between the (worse off) 
mothers eligible for the cash transfer program and the (slightly better off) mothers 
who went through the full application process but did not qualify. 
We also explore the behavioral channels that might explain these effects, 
and provide suggestive evidence that improved maternal nutrition during 
pregnancy likely played a key role. First, although participation in the program 
was announced to be conditional on prenatal health check-ups, this condition was 
never widely advertised to the public nor were they enforced by the Uruguayan 
government. Consistent with this, we find no evidence of increased utilization of 
prenatal care or better quality care among program beneficiaries. This largely 
rules out the possibility that program conditions, or in fact any effect of the 
program operating through improved prenatal care, is driving the reduction in low 
birthweight. 
  
 
 
 
We next show that a range of other behaviors that might help explain the 
reduction in low birthweight – including fertility, residential patterns, and receipt 
of other government transfers – were also not affected by program participation. 
We similarly rule out that an in-kind transfer in the form of a food card, which 
was a secondary component of PANES only introduced in the second year of the 
program, had a meaningful additional effect. Rather than contributing to family 
break-up, PANES transfers actually reduced out-of-wedlock births. 
Several patterns in the data provide suggestive, although not entirely 
definitive, evidence that improved maternal nutrition during pregnancy played a 
role in improving newborns’ weight and health.  While we unfortunately do not 
have direct measures of maternal nutrition or food consumption in our sample, 
secondary data sources indicate that a large share (11.6 percent) of adult females 
in the PANES target population (the bottom income quintile) experienced 
substantial undernutrition, making this channel plausible. We also show that the 
birthweight effects are largely driven by a sharp reduction in intrauterine growth 
retardation (i.e., slower fetal growth at a given gestational age) with no effects on 
gestational length, i.e., there was no change in the likelihood of premature births. 
This pattern leans against the possibility that changes in maternal psychological 
stress or reduced smoking due to the program contributed substantially to the 
improved birthweight outcomes, as the existing biomedical evidence (reviewed in 
section 2 below) finds that stress and smoking in pregnancy both lead to reduced 
gestational length. We also show that the PANES program led to a moderate drop 
in maternal labor supply (although it is sufficiently small that household total 
income still rises in program households). This slight reduction in work hours 
might have also contributed to maternal weight gains during pregnancy via a 
reduction in the mother’s energy use.  
Although our interpretation of the precise underlying mechanisms remains 
necessarily speculative, most concerns regarding adverse behavioral responses 
  
 
 
 
appear to be absent in our data. Unrestricted cash transfers during pregnancy were 
converted into improved child weight and wellbeing at birth, with few negative 
unintended consequences that we can measure. 
 
I. Determinants of low birthweight and the role of income assistance 
A large body of biomedical and economic research identifies maternal nutrition 
and maternal physical and mental health during pregnancy as major determinants 
of birth outcomes in general, and low birthweight in particular. The biomedical 
literature emphasizes that birthweight mainly reflects intrauterine life conditions 
while increasingly acknowledging that genetic factors play a lesser role (Barker 
1990, Gluckman and Hanson 2004, 2005, Painter 2005, 2008).  
Mechanically, low birthweight can result from either reduced gestational 
length or intrauterine growth retardation, IUGR (Kramer 1987, 2003, Gluckman 
and Hanson 2004). While the medical literature recognizes the effect of poor 
maternal nutrition and health, cigarette smoking and genetic history on IUGR, 
somewhat less is known about the determinants of prematurity, with mother’s pre-
pregnancy weight, previous history of prematurity and cigarette smoking being 
well-recognized risk factors (Clausson, Lichtenstein and Cnattingius 2000, 
Kramer 1987, 2003, Murtaugh and Weingart 1995).3  
A considerable amount of evidence on the determinants of low birthweight 
comes from the economics literature. Almond and Mazumder (2011) in particular 
show that maternal fasting during Ramadan has negative effects on birthweight 
(on the order of 40 grams). This is direct evidence that even moderate changes in 
maternal nutrition during pregnancy can affect birthweight, although other 
                                                          
3 The medical literature is less conclusive on the effect of prenatal care on both IUGR and prematurity (Alexander and 
Korenbrot 1995, Kramer 1987, 2001, McCormick and Siegel 2001). The role of maternal stress and anxiety and genital 
tract infections on prematurity is also less well established (Kramer 1987).  
  
 
 
 
mechanisms might also be at play in the Ramadan case (i.e., sleep deprivation or 
changes in work patterns).4 
The detrimental effect of smoking and environmental pollution on 
birthweight, and in particular on reduced gestational length, has also been 
highlighted in economics (Currie 2009, Currie 2011, Currie and Schmieder 2009, 
Currie and Walker 2010, Del Bono et al. 2012). Similarly, it appears that 
exposure to violence and maternal stress reduce gestational length and increase 
low birthweight incidence (Camacho 2008, Aizer, Stroud and Buka 2009, Aizer 
2010). 
More directly related to our analysis, a body of evidence comes from 
studies that analyze government welfare and transfer programs. Several studies, 
largely from the United States, focus on restricted programs (i.e., those 
specifically aimed at improving the nutritional and health status of pregnant 
women). Bitler and Currie (2004) and Hoynes, Page and Stevens (2011) study the 
Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children (WIC), 
which provides food and nutritional advice to pregnant women, and both find that 
it reduces the incidence of low birthweight infants, with effects largely due to 
reduced IUGR rather than gestational length. One channel through which WIC 
appears to have an effect is via greater prenatal care utilization. A limitation of 
these studies is that in order to control for selection into treatment they use either 
a simple selection-on-observables strategy or exploit the variation in take-up 
generated by program roll-out across counties, rather than household treatment 
variation. 
Additional evidence comes from the conditional cash transfers literature. 
Barber and Gertler (2008) evaluate the impact of the Mexican 
                                                          
4 The effects of maternal infections and disease during pregnancy on outcomes at birth and later life have been analyzed, 
among others, by Almond (2006), Case and Paxson (2009) and Barreca (2010). These studies though mainly focus on 
infant mortality rather than on birthweight. 
  
 
 
 
Progresa/Oportunidades program on birthweight, exploiting the random initial 
assignment of the program across communities. In a sample of 840 women, they 
find a very large reduction in the incidence of low birthweight as self-reported in 
a survey (of 4.5 percentage points on a base of around 10 percent) which they 
attribute to better quality prenatal care and the adoption of better health behaviors. 
The interpretation of their results is admittedly complicated by the fact that the 
program also increased the local supply of health care, and that it featured health 
and education conditions. 
Other studies exploit the roll-out of the Food Stamps program across U.S. 
counties, with mixed results. Almond, Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2011a, 2011b) 
find sizeable and precisely estimated effects of Food Stamps on low birthweight, 
as well as on health outcomes later in life. They estimate that exposure to the 
program in the last trimester of pregnancy reduces the incidence of low 
birthweight by 7 to 8 percent for whites and 5 to 12 percent for blacks, with the 
effect coming from reduced intrauterine growth retardation rather than longer 
gestation, consistent with a effects working through maternal nutritional gains. 
Currie and Moretti (2008) do not find this pattern for California, a fact they 
explain with increased endogenous fertility among the subset of mothers who 
were more likely to display worse pregnancy outcomes.  
Direct evidence on the effects of unrestricted cash transfers (as in the 
program we study) is scant but remains important, as one cannot automatically 
presume that cash and in-kind transfers have the same impact. Currie and Cole 
(1993) focus on participation in the U.S. Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) program. Despite the fact that AFDC mothers were also more likely to 
receive Medicaid, Food Stamps and housing subsidies, all of which could 
improve birth outcomes (e.g., see Currie and Gruber 1996 on Medicaid), they find 
no significant effects on low birthweight. Again, the ability to draw strong 
  
 
 
 
conclusions is partly hampered by an identification strategy that relies on 
differential AFDC eligibility criteria across U.S. states. 
A relevant paper is Hoynes, Miller and Simon (2013), which focuses on 
the effect of the U.S. Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) on birthweight. 
Exploiting the differential effects of subsequent EITC reforms on children born at 
different parities, as well as changes in state-level program generosity over time, 
they use a difference-in-differences approach with grouped data to show that 
EITC led to an average reduction of 7 percent in low birthweight incidence, with 
more pronounced effects among less educated and ethnic minority mothers. 
Interestingly, their paper shows effects on both low birthweight and gestational 
length, which they in turn attribute to reduced maternal smoking, reduced 
maternal stress and increased prenatal care utilization.  
In sum, a body of evidence from both economics and medical research 
suggests that maternal nutrition is a key determinant of low birthweight, most 
likely through its effect on intrauterine growth. Equally important, there is 
growing evidence that exposure to pollution and mother’s smoking during 
pregnancy, as well as maternal stress, also affect low birthweight, although these 
effects seems to be mediated at least in part through shorter gestational length. 
 
II. The PANES Program 
The Uruguayan Plan de Atención Nacional a la Emergencia Social (PANES) was 
a temporary social assistance program targeted to the poorest 10 percent of 
households in the country, implemented between April 2005 and December 
2007.5 The program was devised by the center-left government that took office in 
                                                          
5 The program was replaced in January 2008 by a new system of family allowances accompanied by a health care reform 
and an overhaul of the tax system, together called Plan de Equidad. The target population, eligibility rules and assistance 
levels changed in the follow-up program. 
  
 
 
 
March 2005 following the severe economic crisis of the early 2000’s, when per 
capita income fell by more than 10 percent, unemployment reached its highest 
level in twenty years, and the poverty rate doubled. The crisis laid bare the 
weakness of the existing social safety net, which was largely focused on old-age 
pensions, a fact reflected in marked differences in poverty incidence by age, with 
nearly 50 percent of children aged zero to five living in poverty compared to just 
8 percent for the over sixty-five population (UNDP 2008). Despite a rapid 
deterioration in living standards during the crisis, Uruguay remained a good 
performer in terms of infant mortality, birthweight and health care utilization 
relative to other Latin American countries, with levels not too dissimilar to the 
U.S. (Appendix Table A1).6  
A. Program Eligibility 
Following an initial program application phase (which mainly occurred in April 
and May 2005), all applicant households were visited by Ministry of Social 
Development personnel and administered a detailed baseline survey. Because of 
the large volume of applications and the time needed to administer the survey, 
household visits took place throughout most of the second half of 2005, 
sometimes with considerable delay from the original application (Appendix 
Figure A1). 
The baseline survey allowed program officials to compute a predicted 
income score based on a linear combination of many household socioeconomic 
characteristics, which in turn determined program eligibility.7 Households with a 
                                                          
6 In 2005, Uruguay was a middle-income country with annual GDP per capita of US$13,189 (in 2006 PPP), and is home to 
3.3 million individuals. This highly urbanized country experienced rapid economic growth in the early 20th century, and 
was among the first countries in the region with universal primary education and old-age pensions. Uruguay is still among 
the most developed Latin American countries according to the UNDP Human Development Index. 
7 The eligibility score, which was devised by researchers at the Universidad de la Republica in Montevideo (Amarante, 
Arim and Vigorito, 2005), including some of the authors of this paper, was based on a probit model of the likelihood of 
being below a critical per capita income level, using a highly saturated function of household variables, including: the 
  
 
 
 
predicted income score below a predetermined level were assigned to the 
program. The program was not specifically targeted to pregnant women, nor was 
child-bearing an eligibility criterion. Neither the enumerators nor households were 
informed about the variables that entered into the score, the weights attached to 
them, or the eligibility threshold, easing concerns about score manipulation (also 
see section 6). 
Of the 188,671 applicant households (with around 700,000 individuals), 
roughly 102,000 households eventually became program beneficiaries, or 
approximately 10 percent of all Uruguayan households (and 14 percent of the 
national population). The total cost of the program was approximately US$250 
million, i.e. US$2,500 per beneficiary household, and on an annual basis, program 
spending was equivalent to 0.4 percent of GDP. 
B. Program Components 
PANES eligible households were entitled to a monthly cash transfer whose value 
was originally set at US$102 in PPP terms (UY$1,360, equivalent to US$56 in 
non-PPP terms using the 2005 exchange rate) independent of household size, and 
was later adjusted for inflation. This amounted to approximately 25 percent of 
average pre-program household self-reported income for recipient households 
according to the 2006 household survey data. Many households received the first 
cash transfer during 2005, although due to the delays in administering the baseline 
survey, there was considerable variation in the timing of first payments even 
                                                          
presence of children from different age groups, public employees in the household, pensioners in the household, average 
years of education among individuals over age 18 and its square, indicators for age of the household head, residential 
overcrowding, whether the household was renting its residence, toilet facilities and an index of durables ownership. The 
model was estimated using the 2003 and 2004 National Household Survey (Encuesta Continua de Hogares). The resulting 
coefficient estimates were used to predict a poverty score for each applicant household using PANES baseline survey data. 
The eligibility thresholds were allowed to vary across five national regions. Although official government documents used 
a predicted “poverty score”, we use a predicted income score, which is simply -1 times the poverty score. This simplifies 
presentation, as households with higher values of the score are better off, but it obviously makes no difference to the 
analysis.  
  
 
 
 
among the earliest applicants (Appendix Figure A1).  Successful applicants were 
entitled to the transfer for the duration of the program until December 2007, 
provided their income (from all sources) remained below a predetermined level 
(approximately PPP US$100 per month per capita).8 Indeed, a sizeable share of 
beneficiaries eventually dropped out of the program as they re-entered the 
recovering Uruguayan labor market. 
 A second, smaller program component, only launched midway through 
the program in mid-2006, was an electronic food card, whose monthly value 
varied between approximately US$22 and US$60 in PPP terms (UY$300 to 800), 
or between one fourth and one half of the value of the income transfer, depending 
on household size and demographic structure (see Appendix B). We return to this 
feature of the program in the results section, where we show that program impacts 
were already apparent, and of similar magnitude, even before the food card was 
introduced. PANES did not create new health centers, and while there was some 
additional financing for existing public health centers, it was not specifically 
targeted to program beneficiaries. 
 Similar to other recent Latin American cash transfer programs such as 
Progresa/Oportunidades, PANES transfers were originally intended to be 
conditional on mandatory health checks for pregnant women (as well as health 
checks and school attendance for children), but these conditionalities were not 
formally laid out by the government until mid-2007, two years into the program 
and just months away from the end of PANES transfers. Even at that late stage, 
the conditionalities were de facto not enforced due to a lack of coordination 
among the multiple institutional actors involved. This was eventually 
                                                          
8 In practice, the income conditionality criteria only applied to verifiable sources of income, i.e., labor income from formal 
employment as recorded in social security records, retirement pensions or other government transfers and it explicitly 
excluded non-contributory old age-pensions. The social security administration performed periodic checks on PANES 
beneficiaries’ records to enforce this condition. A non-trivial fraction of beneficiaries stopped receiving the transfer before 
the end of the program, typically because of their failure to satisfy this income conditionality. 
  
 
 
 
acknowledged by the government and widely discussed in the local press (El Pais 
2007, El Espectador 2007). Indeed, there is no record of any PANES household 
having lost eligibility due to failure to fulfill the conditionalities. Similarly, there 
is no evidence that program households perceived health checks as a condition for 
program receipt. In a small sample survey of around 2,000 beneficiary households 
(Manacorda, Miguel and Vigorito 2011), only 12 percent listed “prenatal visits” 
as a condition for program receipt. In sum, there were effectively no conditions 
associated with PANES transfers, and we thus treat them as unconditional cash 
transfers. We return to this issue below, and show that the program did not lead to 
greater utilization of prenatal care. 
III. Data 
The analysis brings together several individual-level data sets (Appendix Figure 
A2). PANES administrative records provide information from the initial baseline 
survey visit for both successful (“eligible”) and unsuccessful (“ineligible”) 
applicants on household demographic characteristics, housing conditions, income, 
labor market participation, schooling, durable asset ownership, and the 
household’s exact predicted income score used to determine eligibility. The data 
also contain the unique national identification number (cédula) for all adult 
household members, and allow us to identify individuals belonging to the same 
household at the time of the baseline survey. For successful applicants, the data 
also provide monthly information on the amount of the cash transfer and, if 
applicable, the food card. 
PANES program data are matched to vital statistics natality micro-data that 
provide information on all registered live births in the country (Instituto Nacional 
de Estadística 2009). At 98 percent, the fraction of registered births in Uruguay is 
the highest in Latin America (UNICEF 2005, Duryea, Olgiati and Stone 2006). 
  
 
 
 
Vital statistics come from certificates completed by physicians and they contain 
information on parental characteristics, the reproductive history of the mother, 
prenatal care utilization, and birth outcomes including weight and APGAR scores. 
Since the confidential version of the data used in this paper includes the mother’s 
cédula only from 2003 onwards, we limit the use of vital statistics to 2003-2007. 
This includes a period before the start of PANES (which took place in April 
2005).9  
Finally, we link program and vital statistics data to Social Security records 
for all members of PANES applicant households, again using the unique cédula 
individual number (although we note that we do not have access to social security 
data for those who did not apply to the program). These data contain monthly 
information on all sources of formal income, including income from formal 
employment (for both the self-employed and employees, in both the private and 
the public sector), and all contributory and non-contributory government 
transfers, including pensions, unemployment and disability benefits. Social 
security data are available since March 2004, and thus are available for more than 
a year before the launch of PANES (but starting one year after the earliest 
observations in the natality files). 
The data are summarized in Table 1. The top panel reports averages for the 
period January 2003 to March 2005 before the start of the program (pre-program 
period), while the bottom panel reports information for April 2005 to December 
2007 (program period). We report pre-program outcomes for three groups of 
mothers that we define based on their program application status and predicted 
income score: those who applied and were eligible for PANES (column 1), those 
who went through the full program application process but were unsuccessful 
                                                          
9 We do not use post-2007 data, as 2008 saw the introduction of a different system of family allowances and a health care 
reform (Plan de Equidad). There is evidence of differential participation in the new programs by PANES eligible and 
ineligible households, which may confound estimates of the genuine long-term effect of PANES.  
  
 
 
 
(column 2), and those who did not apply (column 3).10,11 Roughly speaking, these 
three groups correspond to increasingly higher levels of income and socio-
economic status.12 
 The data show a clear gradient in birthweight across groups (rows 1 and 
2). While among PANES eligible mothers the fraction of births below 2,500 
grams is 10.2 percent, among non-applicant mothers it is 8.4 percent, and for 
ineligible applicants it lies in between, at 9.3 percent. There is also a mild gradient 
in APGAR scores at 1 and 5 minutes after birth (rows 3 and 4). APGAR scores 
between 8 and 10 are normal, between 4 and 7 are considered low and below 4 
are critically low. 
 There is no appreciable difference in either gestational length or the 
incidence of premature births (defined as pregnancies of less than 37 weeks) 
between eligible and ineligible applicant mothers, and there is only modest 
evidence of longer gestational length among non-applicant mothers (rows 5 and 
6). Importantly, this suggests that the greater baseline incidence of low weight 
births among program eligible mothers is due largely to greater incidence of slow 
intra-uterine growth rather than prematurity. Using data on all applicants, the 
incidence of low birthweight is disproportionately concentrated among premature 
children (Appendix Figure A3), and the figure also shows that such children 
represent a small fraction of births. 
                                                          
10 Note that we define these three groups on program application status, independent of the time when the child was born. 
The eligible group, for example, includes all children born between January 2003 and December 2007 to mothers who 
applied and were deemed eligible for PANES between March 2005 and December 2007. Note, too, that average differences 
between PANES eligible and ineligible households are often statistically significant in the pre-treatment period. For this 
reason, in the analysis we focus on households with predicted income scores in a neighborhood of the eligibility threshold, 
and show that average differences in baseline characteristics between eligible and ineligible households are small and 
typically not significant in this neighborhood (appendix Table A6). 
11 In the remainder of the analysis, we exclude households for whom the income score was computed before September 
24, 2005 because a different formula was used to compute the predicted income before that date. These early households 
only account for 8.3 percent of all applicant households. 
12 Note that while around 10 percent of households qualify for the program, they contain more than 20 percent of infants 
due to their higher fertility rates. Consistent with this, in 2004 the official poverty rate among households with children was 
53.9 percent, compared to 17.3 percent among childless households.  
  
 
 
 
There is also evidence that PANES eligible mothers had the fewest 
prenatal visits at baseline (6.5 versus 7.5 for ineligible applicants and 8.3 for non-
applicant mothers, Table 1, Panel A, row 7, although the average number of visits 
is still considerable) and that they had their first prenatal visit later in the 
pregnancy (in week 17, compared to week 16 for ineligible applicants and week 
14 for non-applicants, row 8). PANES eligible mothers were also more likely to 
live in areas with lower average birthweight (row 12), more likely to give birth in 
public health centers (row 14) and less likely to be privately insured (row 15).13 
The natality files also report additional information on mothers’ 
reproductive history and parents’ socio-demographic characteristics, and, as 
expected, PANES eligibility status is negatively correlated with mother’s 
education (row 16) and positively correlated with the number of previous 
pregnancies (row 17). PANES eligible mothers were less likely to be married to 
the father’s child (row 18).14 PANES fathers also display lower levels of education 
(row 20).  
Unsurprisingly, data from the social security records show that PANES 
eligible mothers were also less likely to report being employed during pregnancy 
(row 21), had lower formal sector earnings during pregnancy (row 22) and belong 
to households with lower labor and non-labor income (rows 23 to 25). Total 
household monthly income (including earnings and benefits) from social security 
records in the first two trimesters of pregnancy is UY$1,164 for PANES mothers, 
and around twice as much for ineligible applicant mothers.15 Although this figure 
is likely to underestimate true income levels, as it excludes earnings from 
                                                          
13 A universal, de facto free, health system of relatively poor quality coexists in Uruguay with mandated employer-
provided private insurance. In practice, nearly all formal workers have access to private insurance and medical care. 
14 This fraction is quite high in Uruguay as a whole, with nearly 60 percent of children born out-of-wedlock. 
15 Note that pre-treatment income and other outcomes often differ considerably between the eligible and ineligible 
households, and this makes any naïve comparison between them after treatment suspect. We thus focus on households in 
the neighborhood of the eligibility threshold (“barely” eligible vs. ineligible), and show below that pre-treatment 
characteristics are typically similar and not significantly different in this neighborhood.  
  
 
 
 
informal employment and any non-governmental transfers, it remains very low at 
approximately US$90 in PPP terms.  
The bottom panel of Table 1, Panel B reports data for the program period. 
Note that the low birthweight gap between eligible and ineligible applicant 
mothers completely closes during the program period, with the two applicant 
groups of mothers (columns 1 and 2) showing a lower birthweight incidence of 
9.1 percent (row 1). The gap in the APGAR scores also appears to shift slightly in 
favor of eligible mothers (rows 2 and 3). Neither gestational length nor 
prematurity change considerably across periods, and, as in the pre-program 
period, there is no appreciable gradient in these variables across the three groups 
of mothers (rows 4-5). 
Around 97 percent of PANES eligible mothers received the program at 
some point during the period (row 6), although only around 63 percent received it 
during pregnancy (row 7). This gap is due both to the staggered incorporation of 
households into the program as well as to some beneficiaries losing eligibility due 
to their eventual failure to meet the income means test (as discussed above). 
Although a small share of ineligible mothers also eventually received transfers, 
initial eligibility remains a very strong predictor of program receipt.16 PANES 
eligible households do not receive more cash benefits through other government 
programs (row 15), and in fact receive a somewhat lower level of non-PANES 
transfers, as they also did pre-program (row 24 of Panel A). In all, the gap in total 
household income between eligible and ineligible households closes substantially 
although not entirely (row 16), largely due to the PANES transfer (row 8). 
 
                                                          
16 In a related paper (Manacorda, Miguel and Vigorito 2011) we present evidence of nearly perfect compliance with the 
initial eligibility rules. The program enrollment data used in that paper, though, only refer to the period through March 
2006. In the data used in the present paper, we find evidence of somewhat laxer enforcement of the eligibility rules in the 
final six months of the program (namely, the second semester of 2007). 
  
 
 
 
IV. Econometric analysis 
We exploit the discontinuous assignment to the PANES program as a function of 
the baseline predicted income score, and compare outcomes of “barely eligible” 
and “barely ineligible” children in the neighborhood of the eligibility threshold 
using a fuzzy Regression Discontinuity (RD) estimator. As long as assignment 
near the eligibility threshold is “as good as random”, this approach will yield 
estimates of the causal impact of program participation on outcomes. This 
approach accounts for many potential omitted variables, including time-varying 
concerns such as changing earnings over time, which might lead some households 
to lose eligibility (this is dealt with by using baseline program eligibility as the 
key explanatory variable), as well as any mean reversion (which should be 
equally relevant on both sides of the program eligibility threshold).  To 
identify the effect of interest, we exploit the longitudinal dimension of the data 
and mainly focus on changes in outcomes among eligible versus ineligible 
mothers across the pre-program, using a localized difference-in-differences 
estimator within a close neighborhood of the eligibility threshold. This analytical 
approach generates more precise estimates than a traditional regression 
discontinuity (RD) approach that only examines outcomes during the program 
period. Below we also report such cross-sectional RD estimates using data only 
during the program period and we show that they deliver very similar though less 
precise estimates. 
Let Yimt denote a birth outcome (e.g., low birthweight) of child i conceived 
by mother m in month t; Timt denotes an indicator for “treated” births that takes on 
a value of one if the mother received at least one program transfer during the 
pregnancy; Nm denotes mother m’s predicted income score (normalized relative to 
the eligibility threshold such that households with negative Nm are eligible for 
  
 
 
 
treatment); and Dimt is an indicator for births during the program period. Ignoring 
other covariates (for presentational parsimony), the regression model is: 
(1)  Yimt = +  Timt + f(Nm) +Em +Dimt+eimt   
where f(Nm) is function of the predicted income score that is continuous at the 
threshold (Nm=0) and Em is an indicator for the mother’s PANES eligibility, 
namely, Em=1(Nm<0). 
We instrument the PANES treatment variable Timt in eqn. 1 with an 
indicator for the mother’s program eligibility, Em, during the program period, i.e., 
Zimt=Em * Dimt. Formally: 
(2)  Timt =  +  Zimt + g(Nm) +  Em + Dimt + uimt    
 As noted, the instrument is based on the baseline household income score 
regardless of whether the household later stopped receiving transfers, easing 
concerns about any systematic differences (say, in low birthweight risk) for those 
who remain in versus leave the program.17  
 There are several challenges associated with implementing this approach. 
For one, different beneficiary households entered the program in different months 
even if they completed the application survey at the same time (see Appendix 
Figure A1, panel C), and hence had different effective exposure to the program 
(Dimt=1) in particular periods. One obvious concern is that the month of program 
entry might be systematically correlated with important household characteristics. 
Second, the program entry month is only defined for actual program beneficiaries; 
for ineligible applicants, we only have the month they filled in the application 
                                                          
17 A related issue is the possibility of strategic fertility to gain or retain eligibility, however, this seems unlikely. Most 
program applications were collected in a concentrated time period (see appendix figure A1), leaving little time for any 
fertility response. Although ineligible households could apply for a reassessment of their eligibility status as their 
circumstances changed (including child birth), throughout this paper we use the predicted income score at the time of the 
initial application as the instrument for program receipt, easing concerns about later fertility choices. Note, however, that if 
those who maintained program eligibility throughout were not a random sample of the initially eligible, this might affect 
interpretation of the IV estimates. To avoid potential bias that might arise from strategic and endogenous household 
formation choices, we also drop all observations for individuals who joined applicant households in the second or 
subsequent baseline survey rounds. 
  
 
 
 
survey. To address both concerns, we assign each household the same program 
“entry month” for both eligible and ineligible households, namely the first month 
in which any payment was made to a treatment household with a baseline 
application survey completed in a particular month. This removes any 
endogenous component of entry into the program and defines the program entry 
month analogously for eligible and ineligible households. We thus also include 
indicators for mother m’s month of baseline survey (dbm) as regression controls 
throughout (see Appendix Figure A1, Panel B for more detail on the survey 
timing). 
In the empirical model, we also condition on month of conception (dt) 
indicators, which we define as the date of birth minus the gestational length, both 
of which are available in the birth records. We prefer to condition on the month of 
conception rather than month of birth since gestational length could potentially be 
affected by the program. These month of conception terms also account for any 
trends in the incidence of low birthweight due to secular improvements in health 
care quality, in living standards, or in any other factors. 
To assess robustness, we report estimates for the entire sample as well as 
for subsamples within 0.10 and 0.075 of the discontinuity threshold (meaning, 
respectively, differences of 10 and 7.5 percentage points in the estimated 
probability of falling below the poverty line relative to the cutoff). We employed 
different polynomials in the predicted income score (from degree one to degree 
three), where slopes are allowed to vary on either side of the cutoff, and we also 
present results with no controls (in row 1 of Table 2) and with the inclusion of a 
large array of additional controls (in row 2).18 Following Lee and Card (2008), we 
                                                          
18 These include: indicators for 19 geographic departamentos, mother’s age and education (incomplete primary, complete 
primary, complete secondary), sex of the newborn, number of previous pregnancies, number of newborns (twins or more), 
whether the dwelling is a house and whether it is owned, whether the household has centralized hot water, a toilet, a stove, 
micro-wave, refrigerator, freezer, washing machine, dishwasher, heater, central heating, TV, VCR, cable TV, computer, 
  
 
 
 
also cluster standard errors by the values of the running variable, the predicted 
income score.19 Since the income score is the same for all household members, 
this allows for unrestricted correlation in outcomes among children in the same 
household, whether from the same or different mothers. 
V. Empirical results 
A. Main results 
Table 2 presents instrumental variable estimates of eqn. 1 where the dependent 
variable is an indicator for birthweight below 2.5 kg. There is a robust negative 
effect of participation in the PANES program on low birthweight.  This result is 
nearly unchanged for different order polynomials, different ranges of analysis 
near the eligibility threshold, and whether or not additional covariates are 
included. Estimated effects range between -0.019 and -0.025 and are robustly 
statistically significant at over 95 percent confidence.20, 21 
 Appendix Figure A4 plots differences in low birthweight outcomes 
between eligible and ineligible mothers at different leads and lags from program 
                                                          
car, or phone, indicators for material of the floor and walls, number of rooms and bedrooms, whether the block has 
electricity, piped water, sewage, trash collection, paved streets, and public lighting.  
19 There are 37,256, 19,278 and 14,193 groups defined based on the predicted income score, depending on whether one 
uses the entire sample, restricts to the range -0.1/+0.1, or the range -0.075/+0.075, respectively. 
20 Point estimates remain virtually unchanged if we restrict to the even narrower range (-0.05, 0.05) but estimates are much 
less precisely estimated (not shown). 
21 The interpretation of our regression estimates is that eligible households in the neighborhood of the program threshold 
saw an improvement in terms of both income (1,000 pesos) and birth outcomes relative to ineligible households. A 
question is how this finding squares with the evidence in Table 1, Panel A that among all sample households, and not just 
those with predicted income scores near the threshold, eligible and ineligible households have a difference in income of 
around 1,300 pesos (row 25) and a difference in birth outcomes of around 1 percentage point (row 1). During the treatment 
period (Panel B), differences in income are roughly 700 pesos (row 16) while birth outcomes are roughly equalized (row 
1), and thus birth outcomes were effectively equalized across these two groups despite their average incomes not being 
equalized. There are several potential explanations. One is that PANES income might have larger impacts than non-PANES 
income. A second is a non-linear birthweight response to income gains. A third is that total income is measured with error. 
Such measurement error might arise because we use information on income from official social security records, and this 
misses income from informal employment. Informal employment is likely to be higher among eligible households due to 
program eligibility incentives, in which higher reported income could lead to a loss of program transfers. It is thus likely 
that actual household income differences are somewhat less pronounced between eligible and ineligible households post-
treatment than appears to be the case in Table 1. We have no way to definitively disentangle these different explanations 
with the data at hand.  
  
 
 
 
entry (defined as in the regressions) in a range of +/- 2 years, providing a visual 
representation of the variation that we exploit. The left panel presents the entire 
universe of births, and the right panel contains just observations in the range -
0.1/+0.1, and we superimpose the localized difference-in-differences estimates 
(the fitted lines). Despite considerable variability in the data due to the relatively 
limited number of births occurring at each lead and lag, there is a clear “jump” 
(i.e., a reduction in low birthweight among eligible mothers) precisely for births 
occurring after program entry. 
 Mechanically, the reduction in low birthweight as a result of the program 
can be accounted for by either reduced intrauterine growth retardation and/or 
greater gestational length. The biomedical literature suggests that the drivers of 
these two phenomena might be different, so an investigation of these two margins 
can potentially help us understand the leading channels of impact. The estimated 
effect of program exposure on gestational length is just 0.1 weeks, or roughly 0.7 
of a day (Table 3, row 1). This results from a specification with second order 
polynomial controls and a range of -0.1 to 0.1 around the threshold (analogous to 
Table 2, column 5, row 2), a specification we continue to focus on below. This 
increase in gestational is quite modest and not statistically significant at 
conventional levels, and there is similarly no impact on premature births (less 
than 37 weeks, row 2). This implies that the reduction in low birthweight is 
primarily due to improved in intra-uterine growth. 
 There is a modest increase in average birthweight of 31 grams (row 3), 
which is roughly the baseline difference between eligible and ineligible newborns 
(Table 1, Panel A).  
 To investigate effects at different birthweights, we next report the implied 
proportional change in the fraction of newborns below a given weight level, 
together with the associated 95 percent confidence interval (Figure 1). These 
coefficients are estimated based on a series of regressions similar to those in 
  
 
 
 
Table 2 (column 5, row 2). Program exposure significantly reduces the incidence 
of a range of birthweights below 3,000 grams, with effects between 10 to 30 
percent that grow at lower birthweights. Estimates become less precise for 
weights below approximately 2,000 grams due to the smaller number of 
observations in this range.  
 We also report impacts on APGAR scores at both 1 and 5 minutes after 
birth (Table 3, rows 4 and 5). Estimated impacts are positive and significant at 95 
percent confidence, though modest in magnitude (an effect of 0.09 for the score at 
1 minute after birth and 0.06 at 5 minutes). 
 We next explore whether the effects of cash transfers on low birthweight 
are more pronounced among particular subgroups (Appendix Table A2). In 
addition to being prominent in public policy discourse, several of these subgroups 
(i.e., premature children and children of unmarried mothers), are at greater risk of 
having low birthweight (column 2). Despite prematurity being unaffected by the 
program, the reduction in low birthweight was particularly pronounced among 
premature children, with a sizeable reduction of -0.116 (on a base incidence of 60 
percent), and a large increase in average birthweight of 165 g (not shown). The 
low birthweight effect among non-premature children is small (at -0.007) and not 
statistically significant. We also find more pronounced effects among single 
(unmarried) mothers, with a drop of 2.0 percentage points (versus 1.4 points for 
married mothers) and among teen mothers with a drop of 2.9 percentage points 
(versus 2.2 points among non-teen mothers).  
 The evidence in this section indicates that PANES cash transfers 
significantly improved child birth outcomes, reducing the incidence of low 
birthweight by 20 percent. Impacts are largely concentrated among premature 
children and those in the lower tail of the birthweight distribution, suggesting that 
children with the worst birth outcomes gained the most. 
  
 
 
 
B. Alternative estimates and robustness checks 
As a robustness check, we next estimate the model by assuming a fixed program 
entry month that is the same for all households (regardless of the month of their 
baseline survey visit), namely, April 2005, the month the first PANES payment 
was made. The estimated effect is nearly unchanged at -0.024 (s.e. 0.013, Table 4 
row 1), and statistical precision falls somewhat, as expected since this approach 
effectively introduces measurement error into the treatment term.  
We also assess robustness to using data from the program period only 
(Dimt=1) in a RD model. The regression model is: 
(3)  Yimt = +  Timt + f(Nm) +eimt 
The first stage specification is: 
(4)  Timt =  +  Em + g(Nm) + uimt 
where g(Nm) is again a continuous function of its argument at zero and we 
instrument PANES treatment status Timt with an indicator for the mother’s PANES 
eligibility (Em=1(Nm<0)). 
The purely cross-sectional RD estimates are robustly negative and similar 
(or larger) in magnitude to the earlier results, which is reassuring, but they are less 
precisely estimated (Appendix Table A3).22 The use of panel data simply leads to 
much more precise, and thus informative, estimates and we focus on the panel 
approach for the remainder of the analysis. 
This pattern is also apparent in Figure 2, panels A and B, which present 
reduced form estimates, at baseline and at follow-up respectively, in the range (-
0.1, 0.1). Here we plot residuals from regressions of an indicator for low 
                                                          
22 In column 10 of Appendix Table A3, we report RD estimates based on local linear regressions over the entire range of 
support of the predicted income score (with no additional controls), using the optimal bandwidth for a sharp design 
suggested by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). We regard the similarity between estimates in columns 1-9 and in column 
10 as reassuring. We also report point estimates and the associated confidence interval for different levels of the bandwidth 
(from half to twice the optimal bandwidth) in Appendix Figure A5.  
  
 
 
 
birthweight on month of conception, month of baseline visit and all controls (as in 
Table 2, row 2). We present linear regression fits where the intercept and slope 
are allowed to vary on each side of the threshold. Consistent with the underlying 
RD identification assumption, there is no visually apparent discontinuity in low 
birthweight at baseline.23 However, we do find some evidence for a discontinuity 
at the follow-up although estimates are rather imprecise due to sampling 
variability. A clear jump is evident in the first stage estimates (Figure 2 panel C 
and Appendix Table A4). Despite imperfect eligibility enforcement and some 
program dropouts, the estimated increase in the fraction of treated households at 
the threshold for program transfers is large, at 0.66, and very precisely 
estimated.24 
Following McCrary (2008), the left hand-side panel of Appendix Figure 
A7 reports the density of the normalized income score. We find no discontinuity 
in the density of the running variable, suggesting a lack of data manipulation, 
consistent with the identification assumption that assignment around the 
discontinuity was nearly “as good as” random. Appendix Table A6, rows 1 to 36, 
also reports reduced form estimates of the discontinuity for each of the baseline 
covariates at the threshold (we adopt a quadratic specification in the range -0.1, 
0.1, as in column 5, row 1 of Table 2). By and large, most coefficients are small 
                                                          
23 A reader might be surprised by the lack of gradient in the outcome variable with respect to predicted income. This is due 
to the fact that the figure contains a “close neighborhood” around the eligibility threshold. When one considers a wider 
range of predicted income score values, there is clearly an income gradient with the predicted slope. To illustrate, 
Appendix Figure A6 reports the fraction of low birthweight pre-program over the entire range of predicted income scores. 
We also present a quadratic fit to the data while the two vertical lines denote the restricted range of values in the preferred 
regression specifications. Unlike in Figure 2, we simply present means here with no other controls for transparency. There 
is a global negative income gradient, as expected, and it is particularly steep among the poorest households. Consistent 
with Figure 2, there is a smaller slope in the analysis range of -0.1/+0.1. 
24 We have computed additional estimates including mother fixed effects (in the even-numbered columns of Appendix 
Table A6). Although this approach allows us, in principle, to control for unobserved time invariant mother characteristics, 
it relies on the subsample of mothers giving birth during both periods, considerably restricting the sample size. These 
estimates are similar to those in Table 2 but they are imprecisely estimated. Estimates are again similar but less precisely 
estimated in models restricted to the same population of mothers with births in both the pre-program and program periods, 
but which do not include mother fixed effects (in the odd-numbered columns). This suggests that the sample of panel 
mothers is simply too small to deliver precise estimates of program impact. 
  
 
 
 
and not significant, again consistent with assignment around the thresholds being 
as good as random.25 We also report regressions for outcomes during the entire 
pre-program period. We find no evidence of significant differences in the 
incidence of low birthweight, average birthweight, mother labor force 
participation and mother and household income from different sources during pre-
program pregnancies. This evidence argues against systematic sorting around the 
discontinuity, consistent with the finding that the inclusion of covariates does not 
affect estimated program impacts.  
 As an additional test of the robustness of our findings, we present an 
estimate of program impacts on low birthweight obtained based on a different 
econometric identification strategy. In particular, we restrict the analysis to 
households that were treated at some point (i.e., households that received at least 
one PANES payment over the course of the program) and we exploit the gradual 
roll-out of the program across these households, in the spirit of an event-study 
design. In this analysis, we use actual (as opposed to imputed) household entry 
into the program. Formally, we restrict to program households that received the 
program for at least one month (whether eligible or not) and regress outcomes on 
a treatment indicator (Timt). To account simultaneously for take-up among the 
ineligible and program drop-out among the treated, both of which could be 
endogenous, we instrument the treatment indicator with a program period 
indicator Fit – which, differently from Dimt, is based on each household’s own 
program entry date – interacted with an indicator for program eligible households, 
Em. The main and reduced form equations are: 
(5)  Yimt = +  Timt + eimt   
(6)  Timt =  +  Em*Fimt + uimt    
                                                          
25 Only 4 of 36 coefficients are significant at 90 percent, roughly what one would expect given random sampling variation. 
Appendix Figure A8 also shows no evidence of a discontinuity at the threshold for most of the covariates. 
  
 
 
 
where again we also include indicators for mother m’s month of baseline survey 
(dbm), month of conception indicators (dt), an eligibility indicator (Em) and all 
other covariates (not shown here). 
Despite the entirely different source of variation in cash transfers – in 
particular, variation over time in household transfer receipt, in contrast to the 
model in Table 4, row 1, which uses the same entry month for the entire sample – 
and the use of a somewhat different subsample, this approach delivers remarkably 
similar program impact estimates, with an estimated reduction in low birthweight 
of 0.015 (s.e. 0.008, Table 4 row 2), which is significant at 90 percent confidence. 
VI. Channels of Impact 
The richness of the dataset allows us to investigate several behavioral channels 
that could be driving the findings. We also assess the role of the program’s in-
kind food card component. 
A. Income, Labor Supply and In-kind Transfers 
We start by examining the effect of the program on household income. The effect 
on the value of the monthly PANES cash transfer during pregnancy is UY$1,028, 
or approximately US$75 in PPP terms (Table 3, row 6). This figure is roughly 30 
percent lower than the transfer (UY$1,360), consistent with the imperfect 
compliance to program assignment discussed above. Program eligibility is 
associated with higher in-kind food card transfers during pregnancy of UY$193 
per month, or approximately US$15 in PPP (row 7). As with income transfers, 
this is substantially below what in-kind transfers would have been with full take-
up, given both imperfect compliance and the mid-program food card roll-out 
(Appendix Figure A1, panel D).  
  
 
 
 
 This finding raises the question of what role if any the in-kind transfers are 
playing in driving the results above. A differential effect of cash versus the food 
card would not be predicted if households are infra-marginal in terms of food 
consumption. However, if the food card amount is greater than baseline 
household food expenditure, they might have larger effects on birthweight 
(working through maternal nutrition) than equivalent cash transfers. We 
investigate this issue directly in row 3 of Table 4 by exploiting the fact that the 
food card was only rolled out starting in the second half of 2006 (Appendix 
Figure A1).26  Here we report regression results in which we include an indicator 
for receipt of the food card during pregnancy as an additional explanatory 
variable. Since only households in receipt of the income transfer could receive 
food card payments, the coefficient estimate on the food card variable here is the 
incremental effect of receiving a food card over and above the effect of the 
income transfer. 
The effect of the income transfer remains negative and similar to the one 
in the main regressions (-0.033, as opposed to -0.024 in column 5 row 2 of Table 
2, and we cannot reject that this coefficient is equal to -0.024). This implies that 
the low birthweight results are not driven mainly by the in-kind (food card) 
component of the PANES program. The coefficient on the food card is positive (as 
opposed to negative as one would expect) but small and not statistically 
significant (0.015, s.e. 0.023). Indeed, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the 
effect of the food card is the same as the income transfer (p-value=0.14), despite 
the fact that the value of the food card is just 20 percent of the cash transfer; 
moreover, due to limited statistical precision, we cannot reject the hypothesis that 
                                                          
26 As with the date of the first program cash payment, we determine the first month of food card payments for each month 
of baseline application survey visits and assign this month as the entry date into food cards for all households surveyed in 
that month, whether they received a food card or not at that time. We use our preferred specification and instrument receipt 
of the food card with an indicator for program eligibility interacted with the birth occurring at least three months after the 
first food card payment. 
  
 
 
 
the effect of the food card is 20 percent of the effect of the income transfer.27 
Several implications follow. Cash transfers per se have an effect. We also cannot 
reject the hypothesis that cash and in-kind transfers have the same effect, which is 
what one would expect for households that are infra-marginal with respect to food 
consumption.  
Regarding access to other government programs beyond the food card, we 
also find that PANES did not act as a passport into other programs: if anything the 
total transfers received from other government programs fell modestly among 
eligible households (Table 3, row 8). 
Standard theory in labor economics predicts that welfare programs will 
tend to reduce labor supply due to an income effect. In addition, means tested 
programs like PANES have the potential to affect work hours and participation 
due to a substitution effect (Moffitt 2002). While such labor supply responses 
would dampen the increase in expenditures generated by welfare transfers, 
allowing pregnant women to withdraw from the labor market might also reduce 
maternal energy consumption and possibly psychological stress, potentially 
contributing to improved child birth outcomes. Among female program 
beneficiaries who were employed at baseline, nearly 60 percent worked in 
domestic service, a physically strenuous occupation. 
We next specifically examine maternal labor supply and earnings from the 
social security records. There is evidence that PANES mothers reduced their labor 
supply by roughly 4 percentage points (Table 3, row 9) and had somewhat lower 
earnings (of about UY58 or approximately US$4 in PPP terms, row 10). Despite 
these negative labor supply effects and a slight displacement in terms of other 
household benefits, program eligible households still experienced a large and 
                                                          
27 The limited statistical precision presumably stems from the fact that the food card benefit was relatively small in 
magnitude and was only in place for a relatively short period of time. We also cannot reject the hypothesis that there are 
non-linearities in the relationship between income and birthweight, or that program impacts fell over time. 
  
 
 
 
significant increase in total household income of UY$1,000 per month (row 11), 
where this figure includes all sources of formal income and public transfers 
(including PANES transfers) during pregnancy. Thus it appears that labor supply 
responses to the PANES program were far too modest in magnitude to offset the 
direct transfer amount.  
To put this in context, we use a conservative counterfactual, namely, total 
income among ineligible program applicants between July 2006 and December 
2007 (when the program had completely rolled out), which was roughly 
UY$3,650 (or just over US$270 per month in PPP). This implies that the program 
increased total household income relative to this counterfactual by more than 25 
percent. This in turn implies an elasticity of low birthweight with respect to 
household income (as recorded in official government records) during pregnancy 
of between -0.8 and -1.0.  
For comparison, Hoynes et al.’s (2013) estimates imply an elasticity of 
low birthweight with respect to income of between -0.25 and -0.86.28 Our 
estimates are slightly larger, and one possibility is that this is due to greater 
proportional effects at lower income levels (and higher incidence of low 
birthweight). One potential implication is that the “local” effects we estimate at 
the eligibility discontinuity would be a lower bound on the average effect of the 
PANES program on outcomes among the entire population of treated households, 
who tend to be poorer. 29 
                                                          
28 Estimates in Hoynes et al (2013) suggest that an extra 1,000 US$ in the annual EITC refund is associated with a 0.17 to 
0.31 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of low birthweight status. Taking Hoynes et al.’s estimates and assuming 
an average monthly household income of 1,250 US$ per EITC recipient household (i.e., an average income of 15,000 US$ 
per year), and an incidence of low birthweight of 10 percent, yields the elasticities. 
29 We might alternatively be overestimating the elasticity due to mis-measured total income among the eligible (as 
discussed above). Although Uruguay has relatively low levels of informality for Latin America (Loyaza, Servén and 
Sugawara 2009), current work by some of the authors suggests that program incentives affected behavior.  
  
 
 
 
B. Prenatal care 
Evidence from the medical literature suggests that the week of the first prenatal 
care visit and the total number of visits in the first trimester are crucial for the 
detection and treatment of pregnancy risk factors and hence for birth outcomes, 
although their effects on low birthweight are not clearly established in existing 
research. This raises the question of whether and to what extent program effects 
are driven by improvements in the quantity and quality of prenatal care.  
 At first glance, such improvements seem unlikely. As noted above, the 
PANES program was de facto unconditional, and survey evidence indicates that 
the vast majority of beneficiary households were unaware of any formal prenatal 
check condition for pregnant women. Yet it remains possible that beneficiaries 
did obtain some additional access to health care (or felt pressure to make 
additional visits), or that the increased financial resources due to the program 
affected prenatal care utilization, and we next explore this possibility. 
 We report the effect of PANES on the number of prenatal visits overall 
and by trimester, as well as the week of first visit. We do not find any evidence of 
increased prenatal care utilization (Table 3, rows 12-16). If anything the number 
of births assisted by a doctor (row 17) is slightly negatively affected by program 
participation, the fraction of births in public hospitals – which are typically 
considered of lower quality – rises (row 18) and the fraction of deliveries paid by 
private insurance falls (row 19).  A likely explanation is that some program 
beneficiaries lost access to private medical insurance, which in Uruguay is 
typically obtained through formal employment, due to the program’s impact on 
formal labor supply. Yet we do not find any evidence of significant changes in the 
average quality of the health center where the delivery occurred as proxied by the 
center’s (pre-program) average birthweight (row 20). 
  
 
 
 
 Finally, we investigate whether residential mobility increased, and 
specifically whether the PANES transfer led households to move into 
neighborhoods with better average health outcomes (which might contribute to 
better health outcomes through several channels), but find no evidence that 
average child health in the households’ residential area (as proxied by the pre-
PANES average birthweight in the area) improved among program households 
(Table 3, row 21). 
 In sum, we find no evidence of increased prenatal care, and no evidence of 
improvements in the quality of medical care at birth. If anything, the reverse may 
be true to some extent as the drop in formal labor supply among participants 
slightly reduced private insurance coverage. 
C. Family structure and endogenous fertility 
PANES led to a large and statistically significant reduction in the proportion of 
children born to unmarried parents. Thus contrary to what is sometimes 
presumed, welfare transfers led to a moderate increase in marital stability, with a 
drop of 3.0 percentage points (standard 1.1, significant at 95 percent confidence – 
Table 3, row 22) in out-of-wedlock births, on a base of 80 percent. To the extent 
that intact marriages and the presence of the father have positive impacts on the 
mother and child, this could partly explain the program effects on low 
birthweight.30 However, the link between married parents and child health 
                                                          
30 While one concern is that the observed drop in out-of-wedlock births might depend on households’ behavioral response 
to the transfer, this seems highly unlikely. First, marital status did not enter into the computation of the income score used 
to determine program eligibility. Similarly, household size (other than the number of children) did not matter for program 
eligibility (although residential overcrowding did). The program eligibility score formula was unknown to households, 
although we cannot rule out that some households incorrectly assumed that marital status did in fact matter for eligibility 
and adjusted marital status accordingly. Second, eligible mothers may have had incentives to conceal a partner and hence 
not to marry in order to retain program eligibility. This is because a male partner’s formal income would count towards the 
income conditionality, so if anything, one might expect out-of-wedlock births to increase among eligible mothers 
compared to the ineligible. The reduction in out-of-wedlock births in eligible households is thus arguably even more 
striking than it initially appears, given these incentives. 
  
 
 
 
outcomes remains highly speculative, and we do not take a stand on whether 
marriage has benefits for child health here. The increase in marriage rates could 
be due to multiple factors, including the possibility that income transfers led to 
greater relationship stability or that it made the mother a more attractive partner 
(in those cases where she was the household’s program recipient, which is the 
majority of cases). In any case, there is no evidence of the hypothesized adverse 
behavioral responses with respect to marriage. 
Another concern, and an issue of interest in its own right, is that the level 
or timing of fertility might be endogenous to program eligibility and cash transfer 
receipt. Standard economic theory yields ambiguous predictions on the effect of 
household income on fertility: if children are a normal good, the cash transfer 
could increase fertility (Becker 1960), although it might also lead to increased 
investment in child quality while reducing overall fertility.31 Indeed, the existing 
empirical evidence is mixed (Moffitt 1998). The program might also have 
affected fertility via changing access to contraception, abortion or evolving 
fertility preferences, or affected the probability of successfully completing a 
pregnancy through improved fetal survival.32 Endogenous fertility choices could 
lead to biased estimates of program impact if the mothers whose fertility is 
affected have a different risk of low birthweight children.33 
                                                          
31 See Becker and Lewis (1973). An additional effect might arise if program generosity is conditioned on the number of 
children (e.g., Stecklov et al. 2007). However, PANES consisted of a fixed transfer per household. 
32Although abortion was illegal in Uruguay until 2013 (other than when the life of the mother was at risk), it was widely 
practiced. The Centro Internacional de Investigación e Información para la Paz (CIIIP) estimates a rate of voluntary 
abortion of 38.5 percent (for the year 2000). The comparable rate in the U.S. is on the order of 20 percent. 
33 Our data do not provide information on miscarriages (other than as a retrospective question to women who subsequently 
gave birth). We also have no information on infant mortality. The latter is recorded in the official death records but it is not 
possible to link these death records to birth records or to PANES program data, unfortunately. This is because the infant 
mortality data report the national identification number of the child (but not of the mother), while the opposite is true of the 
birth data, and while program data contain information on children’s national ID number, crucially, this is only for those 
children already present in the household at the time of the baseline survey, and thus not for children who were not yet 
born (or those who died before the survey). Some children in the survey are also not assigned a national ID number until 
school enrollment age, especially among poor households, so there is some missing data on child ID, further complicating 
our ability to match across datasets.  
  
 
 
 
To investigate fertility patterns, we restrict the analysis to PANES 
applicant females of roughly child-bearing age (12 to 49 years old) and create a 
monthly panel that spans the period January 2003 to December 2007. For each 
woman in each month, we construct an indicator variable equal to one if the 
woman gave birth and zero otherwise. Overall, we have information on 
approximately 185,000 women over up to 60 months, with more than 10 million 
individual-month observations. The average monthly fertility rate in this sample is 
0.66 percent. 
A challenge in estimating the fertility response to PANES is the fact that 
program eligibility depended in part on the number of children in the household at 
the time of the baseline survey, implying that mothers who gave birth just before 
the survey were considerably more likely to be eligible than otherwise identical 
mothers giving birth just afterwards. This is apparent in Panel A of Appendix 
Figure A9, which plots the probability of a child’s household being a recipient of 
PANES as a function of the child’s date of birth relative to the date of the baseline 
survey. The figure shows a clear discontinuity in the probability of PANES 
treatment as a function of the child’s date of birth. This eligibility rule coupled 
with negative state dependence in childbearing (i.e., the probability of giving birth 
to a child today conditional on a child having been born in the previous nine 
months is basically zero), mechanically leads to a fall in observed fertility among 
eligible mothers after the launch of the program, which might erroneously be 
considered a causal program effect. Some of this is simply mechanical regression 
to the mean, which arises in many other contexts, for example in job training 
programs (Ashenfelter 1978, Card and Sullivan 1988). Consistent with this 
mechanism, the difference in fertility between PANES eligible and ineligible 
applicants displays a sharp drop between the pre-program and program period, 
i.e., before and after the date of first program payment (panel B). 
  
 
 
 
A first piece of evidence that compositional differences between eligible 
and ineligible households are driving this pattern is found in panels C to E of 
Appendix Figure A9, which successively plot monthly fertility rates for applicant 
mothers as a function of the time to and since the first program payment, 
separately by the number of children born between January 2003 and the baseline 
survey (namely, 0, 1, or 2 or more children). Conditional on the mother’s past 
fertility, patterns during the program are nearly identical for the eligible and 
ineligible. 
A simple way to correct for the bias induced by this compositional effect 
in the regressions is to use a matching estimator that re-weights observations for 
PANES ineligible mothers so that the pre-program fertility is the same as for 
eligible mothers. We use the number of pregnancies at different lags before the 
date of the baseline survey (1 to 3 months, 4 to 6 months, etc., as well as 
indicators for any missing values of these variables) from the natality files, plus 
the mother’s age, mother’s education (in five groups) and the month of the 
baseline survey to fit a probit model in which the dependent variable is an 
indicator variable for program eligibility. We use the predicted values from this 
probit regression to assign ineligible mothers a weight that is equal to the 
predicted probability of being eligible (relative to being ineligible), while we 
assign a weight equal to one to all eligible mothers. In practice, this procedure re-
weights observations for ineligible mothers so that their distribution of observable 
characteristics at baseline mimics that of eligible mothers, as in a matching 
estimator. 
Estimates are reported in Table 5, where the dependent variable is an 
indicator for fertility (multiplied by 100). We use eqn. 1 and 2, as in Table 2, and 
for brevity only report specifications with a quadratic polynomial in the baseline 
predicted income score (although results are not sensitive to this choice). Columns 
1 to 3, respectively, report unweighted estimates for the entire range of variation 
  
 
 
 
of the income score and then in neighbourhoods of the eligibility threshold (-0.1, 
0.1 in column 2; -0.075, 0.075 in column 3). Columns 4 to 6 report re-weighted 
estimates that correct for compositional differences. Row 1 presents results 
without additional controls while row 2 presents results with the entire set of 
baseline controls. 
Naïve estimates imply that fertility falls as a result of program 
participation (columns 1 to 3) which is consistent with Panel B of Appendix 
Figure A9. However, the re-weighted estimates (in columns 4 to 6) show an effect 
of program participation on fertility that is positive and, when one restricts to a 
neighbourhood around the eligibility threshold, the fertility estimates are small 
and not statistically significant. The inclusion of controls makes virtually no 
difference. 
We turn to investigating the effects of the mechanical fall in fertility 
among treated households on our estimates of the program’s impact on low 
birthweight. A leading concern is that birth outcomes might be correlated with the 
mother’s fertility history, which in turn affects program eligibility. We note at the 
onset that in Table 2 the standard controls also included the number of previous 
births, meaning that any bias arising from any spurious correlation between prior 
birth outcomes and program eligibility should be accounted for. For further 
reassurance, we report estimates of program impact on low birthweight 
reweighting by the fertility weights, and obtain an estimate of -0.025 (s.e. 0.010, 
Table 4 row 4), which is very similar to the main unweighted estimates in Table 
2, again suggesting that selection based on mother’s fertility history plays little to 
no role in explaining the drop in low birthweight for PANES beneficiaries. 
  
 
 
 
VII. Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper studies the impact of a social assistance program on the incidence of 
low birthweight in Uruguay. The program mainly consisted of a cash transfer that 
was targeted to households in the bottom decile of the income distribution, a 
population with an incidence of low birthweight of around 10 percent. Using a 
unique matched micro-dataset with vital statistics, program, hospital and social 
security records, our estimates imply a drop in the incidence of low birthweight 
on the order of 20 percent, allowing beneficiaries to close the baseline gap in low 
birthweight incidence with the slightly better-off households who applied for the 
program but were ineligible for assistance. The results suggest that cash assistance 
may potentially help to break the cycle of intergenerational poverty by improving 
child health. This result is derived using a localized difference-in-differences 
estimator within a close neighborhood of the program eligibility threshold, an 
approach that generates more precise estimates than a traditional RD approach.  
We also obtain very similar results using a different econometric identification 
strategy which, in the spirit of an event-study, exploits variation in the month of 
program entry.  
In terms of the biomedical channels, the effect of the program on low 
birthweight mainly operates through a reduction in intrauterine growth 
retardation, and in particular improved birthweight among premature children. 
The unusually rich dataset also allows us to explore a large number of behavioral 
mechanisms. Although we find some evidence of minor offsetting household 
labor supply responses, most likely induced in part by the means-tested nature of 
the program, we show that PANES receipt increased eligible mothers’ total net 
household income by at least 25 percent, which may have improved maternal 
nutrition. The drop in labor market participation among beneficiaries contributed 
to slightly lower private health insurance coverage. We also show that the in-kind 
  
 
 
 
food card component cannot account for the birthweight impacts. The PANES 
program did not increase family break-up and in fact reduced out-of-wedlock 
births.  
Increases in pre-natal health care utilization and improved health quality 
care also do not explain our results. Although we are unable to say anything 
conclusive about how outcomes would have differed in the presence of strictly 
enforced prenatal visit conditions, this is a noteworthy result in itself given the 
current policy debate in development economics regarding the role of 
conditionality in social programs (Baird, McIntosh and Özler 2011). 
Equally important, we do not find evidence of substantial fertility effects 
among welfare eligible women, and we show that there are no meaningful 
program impacts on either residential migration or take-up of other government 
programs, implying that program effects cannot be attributed to these alternative 
channels. We have no direct measures of the mother’s levels of mental stress, nor 
of smoking during pregnancy, unfortunately, but these channels appear less likely 
to have played a major role in our case, since recent biomedical evidence 
indicates that these factors are most likely reduce gestational length and increase 
prematurity, but no reduction in gestational length is found in our data.  
Taken together, the evidence points unequivocally to the cash transfer 
component itself, and the improved living standards that it provided, as the key 
driver behind improved birth outcomes. The maternal nutrition channel is a 
natural candidate as a main driver of the low birth weight effect. We lack data on 
mothers’ nutritional status, weight, food expenditure and caloric intake during 
pregnancy, and thus the precise role of this channel remains somewhat 
speculative, and we cannot rule out other explanations, such as greater female 
empowerment due to program participation. Yet this interpretation would be in 
line with several studies evaluating the impact of U.S. social programs that also 
emphasize the key role of improved maternal nutrition. 
  
 
 
 
Finally, the findings in this paper appear relevant not just for Latin 
American countries but also potentially for wealthier societies given Uruguay’s 
reasonably good average infant health outcomes, which are similar to those 
observed in poor populations in the U.S., and the nearly universal access to 
prenatal care in the country.  
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FIGURE 1— ESTIMATED PROPORTIONAL PROGRAM EFFECTS BY BIRTHWEIGHT 
 
 
Notes: The figure reports the estimated percentage change in the probability of being below each level of birthweight as a result of PANES treatment. Each point comes from a separate 2SLS regression 
including controls (as in column 5 of Table 2, row 2). 95 percent confidence intervals around the estimates also reported. See also notes to Table 2.  
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A: Proportion of low weight births, 
pre-program period 
B: Proportion of low weight births, 
program period 
C: Receipt of PANES income transfer during 
pregnancy, program period 
    
 
FIGURE 2: PROPORTION OF LOW BIRTHWEIGHT AND TREATED BIRTHS AS A FUNCTION OF THE PREDICTED INCOME SCORE 
 
Notes: Panel A reports the proportion of low weight births in the pre-program period (conditional on month of conception, month of baseline visit and all controls) among PANES applicant mothers as a 
function of the normalized income score during the pre-program period (horizontal axis).  A vertical line corresponds to the PANES eligibility threshold at the normalized predicted income score of zero. 
The figure also reports a linear fit in the income score estimated on either side of the threshold (solid lines) as well as the 95 percent confidence intervals around the linear prediction (thin dotted lines). 
Panels B and C report analogous graphs where the variables on the vertical axis are, respectively, the proportion of low weight births in the program period, and the fraction of mothers in receipt of the 
income transfer during pregnancy (during the program period). The series in Panels A and B are residuals from a regression of the outcome variable on the set of controls in Table 2, row 2. The size of 
the points in all panels is proportional to the number of observations in that cell. 
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TABLE 1 —  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, ALL BIRTHS IN URUGUAY  
 
  
PANES Applicants 
  
Non-applicants 
Panel A. Pre-program period (January 2003 – March 2005) Eligible 
(1) 
Ineligible 
(2) 
  
(3) 
1. Low birthweight 0.102 0.093  0.084 
2. Birthweight (g) 3141.05 3161.35  3217.92 
3. APGAR - 1 minute 8.48 8.50  8.51 
4. APGAR - 5 minutes 9.60 9.60  9.62 
5. Gestational length (weeks) 38.50 38.50  38.56 
6. Premature (gestational length <37 weeks) 0.101 0.099  0.092 
7. Total number of prenatal visits 6.53 7.53  8.28 
8. Week of first prenatal visit 17.50 16.24  14.16 
9. Number of visits, first trimester 0.31 0.40  0.63 
10. Number of visits, second trimester 1.61 1.92  2.19 
11. Number of visits, third trimester 4.61 5.22  5.46 
12. Average birthweight area of residence 3193.53 3196.20  3200.88 
13. Average birthweight health center 3170.43 3185.76  3207.59 
14. Public health center delivery 0.77 0.55  0.33 
15. Birth delivery paid by private health insurance 0.06 0.14  0.43 
16. Mother incomplete primary education 0.12 0.05  0.04 
17. Number of previous pregnancies 2.37 1.44  1.26 
18. Out-of-wedlock birth 0.80 0.72  0.52 
19. Missing child father information 0.61 0.51  0.31 
20. Father incomplete primary education 0.095 0.095  0.092 
21. Mother works during pregnancy 0.12 0.18  0.43 
22. Mother earnings during pregnancy ± 94.19 253.01  - 
23. Household earnings during pregnancy ± 585.14 1678.35  - 
24. Household non-PANES benefits during pregnancy ± 578.60 874.08  - 
25. Household total income during pregnancy ±  1163.90 2553.66  - 
26. Mother age 25.43 24.78  27.50 
27. Father age 30.77 29.62  31.93 
28. Birth assisted by doctor 0.49 0.55  0.71 
 
Notes: Panel A contains information on all births between January 2003 and March 2005. ±: data available only since March 2004 and only for 
program applicants. The earnings and transfers variables are in UY$ per month. 1 UY$ = US$ 0.075 at 2005 PPP adjusted exchange rate. Panel B 
contains information on all births between April 2005 and December 2007. Some of the additional data presented in Panel A is from the PANES 
program baseline (pre-program) applicant survey. 
PANES Applicants  Non-applicants 
Panel B.  Program period (April 2005 – December 2007) 
 
  1. Low birthweight 
Eligible 
(1) 
Ineligible 
(2) 
  
(3) 
0.091 0.091  0.082 
2. APGAR - 1 minute 8.49 8.46  8.50 
3. APGAR - 5 minutes 9.61 9.59  9.63 
4. Gestational length (weeks) 38.51 38.51  38.53 
5. Prematurity (gestational length <37 weeks) 0.095 0.10  0.09 
6. Ever received PANES income transfer 0.97 0.11  - 
7. PANES income transfer during pregnancy (0/1) 0.63 0.08  - 
8. Amount of PANES income transfer during pregnancy  650.57 73.37  - 
9. Ever received PANES food card 0.80 0.12  - 
10. PANES food card during pregnancy (0/1) 0.41 0.05  - 
11. Amount of PANES food card during pregnancy  149.91 13.74  - 
12. Mother works during pregnancy 0.12 0.18  0.43 
13. Mother earnings during pregnancy ± 114.75 298.40  - 
14. Household earnings during pregnancy ± 825.31 1996.78  - 
15. Household non-PANES benefits during pregnancy ± 722.78 937.76  - 
16. Household total income during pregnancy ±  2348.57 3021.66  - 
Observations 50,939 20,872  163,370 
  
 
TABLE 2— 2SLS ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT OF THE PANES TRANSFER ON LOW BIRTHWEIGHT (<2.500 KG) 
POOLED PRE-PROGRAM AND PROGRAM PERIOD DATA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
         
1. No controls -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.020** -0.020** -0.020** -0.023** -0.023** -0.023** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
          
2. With controls -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.024** -0.024** -0.024** -0.025** -0.025** -0.025** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
          
Observations 65,655 65,655 65,655 31,512 31,512 31,512 24,212 24,212 24,212 
Range All All All 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.075 0.075 0.075 
Order of polynomial 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
 
Notes: Each cell refers to a separate regression. Entries are 2SLS estimated coefficients from regressions that pool pre-program and post program 
data where the dependent variable is an indicator for birthweight less than 2.5 kg and the independent variable is an indicator for the mother 
participating to the program during pregnancy (equation (1)), where the latter is instrumented by an indicator for mother eligibility for PANES for 
births occurring during the program period only (equation (2)). First stage estimates are reported in Appendix Table A4. Regressions differ in 
terms on the sample used (in different ranges around the eligibility threshold) and the order of the polynomial in the baseline income score. All 
regressions include an indicator for program eligible mothers, an indicator for births occurring in the program period, month of conception and 
month of baseline survey indicators. Row 1 presents regressions with no additional controls while row 2 reports results with the following 
additional controls: indicators for geographic departamento (19), for mother’s age and mother’s education (incomplete primary, complete 
primary, complete secondary), sex of the new-born, number of previous pregnancies, number of new-borns (twins or more), whether dwelling is a 
house, whether the household has centralized hot water, heater, stove, micro-wave, refrigerator, freezer, washing machine, dishwasher, central 
heating, TV, VCR, cable TV, COMPUTER, car, or phone, whether the block has electricity, piped water, sewage, trash collection, paved streets, 
public lighting, whether the home is owned, indicators for material of the floor and walls, whether the home has a toilet, number of rooms, 
number of bedrooms. Standard errors clustered by income score and number of observations reported below each coefficient. ***, **, *: 
Significant at 99, 95 and 90 percent level.  
 
             
           
  
 
TABLE 3— PANES PROGRAM EFFECTS ON ADDITIONAL OUTCOMES 
Dependent variable:  
1. Weeks of gestation 0.101 
 (0.067) 
2. Premature birth -0.010 
  (0.010) 
3. Birthweight 30.853* 
 (18.438) 
4. Apgar-1 minute 0.089** 
 (0.037) 
5. Apgar-5 minutes 0.055** 
 (0.027) 
6. Value of program income transfer during pregnancy (‘000 UY$) 1.028*** 
 (0.008) 
7. Value of food card during pregnancy (‘000 UY$) 0.193*** 
 (0.004) 
8. Other household government benefits during pregnancy  -0.116** 
 (0.052) 
9. Mother works during pregnancy -0.039*** 
 (0.012) 
10. Mother formal earnings during pregnancy (‘000 UY$) -0.058** 
 (0.028) 
11. Household total income during pregnancy (‘000 UY$) 1.000*** 
 (0.121) 
12. Total number of prenatal visits 0.019 
 (0.106) 
13. Number of prenatal visits, first trimester -0.035 
 (0.026) 
14. Number of prenatal visits, second trimester 0.045 
 (0.043) 
15. Number of prenatal visits, third trimester 0.009 
 (0.081) 
16. Week of first prenatal visit 0.013 
 (0.240) 
17. Birth assisted by a medical doctor -0.028* 
 (0.016) 
18. Public hospital delivery 0.031** 
 (0.015) 
19. Birth delivery paid by private health insurance -0.024** 
 (0.010) 
20. Average pre-PANES birthweight in health center (g) -1.136 
 (1.731) 
21. Average pre-PANES birthweight in area of residence (g) -1.102 
 (1.051) 
22. Out-of-wedlock birth -0.044** 
 (0.013) 
 
Notes: 2SLS estimates of the effect of PANES participation on various dependent variables, in a specification equivalent to Table 2, column 5, 
row 2. See also notes to Tables 1 and 2. 
 
  
  
 
TABLE 4— PANES PROGRAM EFFECTS ON BIRTHWEIGHT, ADDITIONAL SPECIFICATIONS 
  
1. Fixed entry date -0.024* 
 (0.013) 
Observations 31,512 
  
2. Event study approach -0.015* 
 (0.008) 
Observations 46,614 
  
3. PANES transfer  
-0.033* 
 
(0.018) 
  + Food card 0.015 
 
(0.023) 
Observations 23,675 
  
4. Reweighted -0.025** 
 (0.010) 
Observations   31,001 
 
Notes: Row 1 presents estimates like the ones in table 2 where it is assumed that the program period starts in April 2005 for all households. Row 
2 presents results from the event study analysis computed on the sample of ever-treated mothers (see text for details). Row 3 separates the effect 
of the PANES transfer from the additional effect of receiving the food card. Row 4 reports re-weighted estimates (as in row 2 of Table 5). All 
specifications include all controls and except the one in row 1 also include a quadratic polynomial in the predicted income score and are restricted 
to the range -0.1 to 0.1 for the predicted income score. See also notes to Table 2. 
 
 
 
TABLE 5— PANES PROGRAM EFFECTS ON FERTILITY (X 100) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
1. No controls -0.249*** -0.105** -0.085*** 0.081*** 0.022 0.016 
 (0.011) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) 
       
2. With controls -0.247*** -0.102** -0.082*** 0.083*** 0.024 0.018 
 (0.011) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) 
       
Observations 10,048,632 5,677,586 4,464,166 10,048,632 5,677,586 4,464,166 
       
Weighted No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Range All 0.10 0.075 All 0.01 0.075 
Order of polynomial 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 
Notes: 2SLS estimates of the effect of PANES participation on a fertility indicator (multiplied by 100), in a specification equivalent to Table 2, 
columns 5, row 2. Row 1 of the table reports specifications with the inclusion of month of observation and month of visit fixed effects only while 
row 2 reports specifications with additional controls (see Table 2). Columns (1) to (3) report unweighted regressions while columns (4) to (6) 
report specifications weighted by matching weights (see section 7.3 of the text for details). See also notes to Tables 1-4. 
 
  
 
Appendix 
 
Appendix A: Additional tables and figures 
 
APPENDIX TABLE A1— CHILD BIRTH OUTCOMES AND INCOME LEVELS  
IN URUGUAY, U.S. AND LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN 
 
 
Country/Region 
Low birth  
weight,  
percent (a) 
Infant mortality 
rate (per 1000) 
(b) 
Births assisted by 
health personnel, 
percent(c) 
At least one 
prenatal visit, 
percent(c) 
Per capita GDP  
(PPP US$)(d) 
      
Uruguay  8 11 99 97 13,189 
United States 8 7 99 99 45,989 
Latin America/Caribbean 9 19 96 95 10,575 
 
Notes: (a) Source: United Nations Children's Fund (2009), Global database on low birthweight, and Ministerio de Salud Pública (2011), 
Estadísticas Vitales, Montevideo, Uruguay. The column reports the fraction of low weight births defined as children weighting less than 2.5 kg 
per 100 births. (b) Source: Pan American Health Organization, reported in World Health Organization (2009), World Health Statistics, Geneva. 
The column reports the probability of dying between birth and one year per 1,000 births. (c) Source: World Health Organization (2011). World 
Health Statistics, Geneva. (d) Source: World Bank (2011), World Development indicators. The World Bank, Washington. The column reports 
PPP-adjusted GDP per capita in US$.  
  
 
APPENDIX TABLE A2— HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS 
1. By gestational length 
Coefficient 
(standard error) Sample means 
Normal gestational length (≥ 37 weeks) -0.008 
0.04 
 (0.007)  
Observations 28,493  
Premature (< 37 weeks) -0.116** 
0.60 
 (0.056)  
Observations 3,019  
   
2. By mother’s age   
Teen mothers -0.029 
0.09 
 (0.025)  
Observations 6,544  
Non-teen mothers -0.022** 
0.11 
 (0.010)  
Observations 24,968  
   
3. By mother’s marital status   
Married mother -0.014 
0.08 
 (0.023)  
Observations 6,122  
Unmarried mother -0.020* 
0.10 
 (0.010)  
Observations 25,390  
   
4. By household size    
Smaller households (three or fewer household members, avg: 2.7) -0.011 0.10 
 (0.014)  
Observations 12,747  
Larger households (at least four household members, avg: 5.8) -0.029** 0.09 
 (0.013)  
Observations 18,765  
 
Notes: Column 1 of the table reports 2SLS estimates of the program on low birthweight by subgroups (by gestational length, mother’s age, 
baseline marital status, and household size). All specifications include all controls and restricted to observations in the range -0.1,0.1 as in column 
5 of Table 2. Column 2 reports average incidence of low birthweight by subgroup. See also notes to Table 2.
  
 
APPENDIX TABLE A3 — 2SLS ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT OF THE PANES TRANSFER ON LOW BIRTHWEIGHT (<2.500 KG) – PROGRAM PERIOD DATA ONLY 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
          
1. No controls -0.006 -0.013 -0.012 -0.022 -0.027 -0.046 -0.023 -0.040 -0.053 -0.022 
 (0.010) (0.016) (0.021) (0.016) (0.026) (0.034) (0.019) (0.030) (0.041) (0.017) 
           
2. With controls -0.018* -0.013 -0.001 -0.019 -0.011 -0.034 -0.015 -0.022 -0.053 - 
 (0.010) (0.015) (0.020) (0.016) (0.025) (0.033) (0.019) (0.029) (0.040) - 
           
Observations 22,534 22,534 22,534 11,276 11,276 11,276 8,756 8,756 8,756 22,534 
Range All All All 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.075 0.075 0.075 All 
Order of polynomial 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 Local 
polynomial 
 
Notes: Regressions similar to those in Table 2 computed on program period data only. Column (10) additionally reports regressions where a local linear polynomial is fitted on either side of the 
threshold. See also text and notes to Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX TABLE A4— FIRST STAGE ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT OF THE ELIGIBILITY ON PANES INCOME TRANSFER 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
         
1. No controls 0.722*** 0.723*** 0.722*** 0.691*** 0.691*** 0.691*** 0.686*** 0.686*** 0.686*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
          
2. With controls 0.727*** 0.727*** 0.727*** 0.690*** 0.690*** 0.690*** 0.684*** 0.685*** 0.685*** 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.018)  
          
Observations 65,655 65,655 65,655 31,512 31,512 31,512 24,212 24,212 24,212 
Range All All All 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.075 0.075 0.075 
Order of polynomial 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
 
Notes: See notes to Table 2. 
  
  
 
APPENDIX TABLE A5— 2SLS ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT OF THE PANES INCOME TRANSFER ON LOW BIRTHWEIGHT (<2.500 KG) –  
POOLED PRE-PROGRAM AND PROGRAM PERIOD DATA - PANEL SAMPLE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
      
1. No controls -0.009 0.000 -0.011 0.002 -0.011 0.002 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.020) (0.018) (0.023) (0.021) 
       
2. With controls -0.009 -0.015 -0.016 -0.008 -0.012 -0.006 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.018) (0.020) (0.021) 
       
Observations 23,691 23,691 9,658 9,391 7,113 7,113 
Range All All 0.1 0.1 0.075 0.075 
Order of polynomial / specification 2 FE 2 FE 2 FE 
 
Notes: Regression results similar to those in Table 2 estimated on a sample of mothers giving birth in both the pre-program and the program periods. Specifications in even number columns include 
mother fixed effects. See also notes to Table 2.              
 
  
 
APPENDIX TABLE A6: REDUCED FORM ESTIMATES OF THE COVARIATE DISCONTINUITY AT THE THRESHOLD 
 
Non-eligible 
mean 
Coef. s.e. 
1. Mother’s Age 25.377 0.294  (0.266)  
2. Incomplete primary 0.053 -0.013 (0.009) 
3. Complete primary 0.802 0.020 (0.014) 
4. Complete secondary 0.084 -0.002 (0.009) 
5. Sex of new-born 0.511 0.012 (0.017) 
6. Number of previous pregnancies 1.529 -0.054 (0.077) 
7. Number of new-borns 1.018 -0.008 (0.007) 
8. House 0.880 -0.009 (0.015) 
9. Heating 0.336 -0.009 (0.023) 
10. Water heater 0.192 0.017 (0.019) 
11. Stove 0.717 0.010 (0.024) 
12. Micro-wave 0.061 -0.002 (0.008) 
13. Refrigerator 0.676 0.029 (0.028) 
14. Freezer 0.104 -0.007 (0.011) 
15. Washing Machine 0.222 -0.020 (0.017) 
16. Dish Washer 0.002 0.002 (0.002) 
17. Heater 0.122 -0.003 (0.013) 
18. Central heating 0.007 -0.001 (0.003) 
19. TV 0.818 -0.005 (0.026) 
20. VCR 0.056 -0.005 (0.008) 
21. Cable TV 0.134 0.030*** (0.013) 
22. COMPUTER 0.014 -0.002 (0.004) 
23. Car 0.035 0.004 (0.006) 
24. Phone 0.263 -0.030 (0.019) 
25. Block has electricity 0.977 0.003 (0.007) 
26. Block has piped water 0.944 0.009 (0.010) 
27. Block has sewage 0.407 0.053** (0.021) 
28. Block has trash collection 0.903 0.019 (0.012) 
29. Block has paved streets 0.668 0.017 (0.019) 
30. Block has public lighting 0.695 0.047** (0.019) 
31. Home owned 0.388 -0.031 (0.021) 
32. Floor 0426 0.035* (0.021) 
33. Wall 0.924 0.007 (0.013) 
34. Toilet 0.877 -0.015 (0.015) 
35. Number of rooms 2.473 0.107 (0.072) 
36. Number of bedrooms 1.749 0.091** (0.044) 
37. Low birthweight 0.089 -0.005 (0.012) 
38. Birthweight (g) 3,180 3.303 (23.414) 
39. APGAR - 1 minute 8.522 -0.005 (0.046) 
40. APGAR - 5 minutes 9.633 0.009 (0.034) 
41. Mother works  0.171 0.022 (0.015) 
42. Mother earnings during pregnancy  223.98 25.265 (31.791) 
43. Household total income during pregnancy 861.284 -74.215 (179.572) 
 
Notes: The table reports reduced form regressions of each variable in column 1 on eligibility indicator and quadratic polynomials in the income 
score plus month of baseline survey dummies for observations in the range -0.1,0.1. Rows 1 to 36 refer to variables measured in the baseline 
survey. The remaining rows report results for birth outcomes among pregnancies that occurred before the program period. Rows 38 to 43 
additionally control for month of conception dummies. See also notes to Table 2.      
      
  
 
 
 A: Application  B: Baseline survey  C: First income transfer payment 
   
   
 D: First payment of food card  E: Baseline survey–Application (months)  F: First income transfer–Baseline survey (months) 
   
 
APPENDIX FIGURE A1— THE TIMING OF PANES PROGRAM MILESTONES 
 
Notes: The figure reports the distribution of key program dates: application date (A), date of baseline survey (B), date of first payment of income transfer (C), date of first payment of the food card (D). 
Panels E reports the distribution of the differences between the variables in panels B and A, and Panel F reports the distribution of the differences between the variables in Panels C and B. 
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APPENDIX FIGURE A2— TIMING OF PANES PROGRAM ACTIVITIES AND DATA COLLECTION 
 
  
Income transfer 
May 2005  
 
Program ends 
December 2007 
PANES application 
April 2005  
Baseline visit 
April 2005  
 
Administrative 
decisions on eligibility 
time 
Baseline survey 
April 2005  
 
 
Vital statistics data (universe) 
January 2003 - December 2007 
 
Social security data (program 
applicants only) 
April 2004 - December 2007 
 
 
Administrative program data 
May 2005 - December 2007 
 
PROGRAM PERIOD 
 
PRE-PROGRAM PERIOD 
 
Food card 
April 2006  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX FIGURE A3— INCIDENCE OF LOW BIRTHWEIGHT BY WEEKS OF GESTATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF WEEKS OF GESTATION 
 
Notes: The left hand side panel of the figure reports the fraction of low weight births (<2,500 g.) by weeks of gestation. The right hand side panel reports the frequency distribution of weeks of gestation. 
A vertical line corresponds to 36.5 weeks of gestation. Births to the left of it are labeled as premature. The data refer to PANES applicant mothers (whether eligible or ineligible) over the entire period 
(January 2003 to December 2007). 
  
  
  
 
 
All observations Range -0.1/+0.1 
 
 
 
APPENDIX FIGURE A4— DIFFERENCE IN THE INCIDENCE OF LOW BIRTH WEIGHT BETWEEN ELIGIBLE AND INELIGIBLE HOUSEHOLDS AT DIFFERENT 
 LAGS AND LEADS TO/SINCE THE TIME OF FIRST PROGRAM PAYMENT 
 
Notes: The figure plots the raw difference in low birth outcomes between eligible and ineligible mothers at different leads and lags from the data of program entry (defined precisely as in the 
regressions) in a range of plus or minus 2 years (as in Appendix Figure A9, Panel B). We plot this figure for the entire universe of births in the left panel, and just for observations in the range -0.1/+0.1 
in the right panel. We superimpose our localized diff-in-diff estimates onto the figure (the fitted lines). 
  
  
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX FIGURE A5— FUZZY RD ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT OF THE PANES TRANSFER ON LOW BIRTHWEIGHT (<2.500 KG)  
 PROGRAM PERIOD DATA – USING LOCAL LINEAR POLYNOMIALS FOR DIFFERENT VALUE OF THE BANDWIDTH 
 
 
Notes: The figure reports RD estimates and the associated 95 percent confidence intervals of the effect of the program on the incidence of low birthweight during the program period only using a local 
linear polynomial in the score. Different estimates for different values of the bandwidth (from half to twice Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012)’s optimal bandwidth) are reported. 
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APPENDIX FIGURE A6— PROPORTION OF LOW WEIGHT BIRTHS PRE-PROGRAM PERIOD, OVER ENTIRE RANGE OF VARIATION OF THE PREDICTED INCOME SCORE 
 
Notes: The figure reports the fraction of low birthweight pre-program, over the entire range of variation of the discretized (in multiples of 0.1) predicted income score. We also present a quadratic fit to 
the data while two vertical lines report the range of values that we restrict our attention to in our preferred regression specifications.  
 
  
 
  
 
 
Panel A: Distribution of the standardized PANES predicted 
income score, McCrary (2008) test 
Panel B: Distribution of the birthweight measure (in grams) 
  
 
APPENDIX FIGURE A7— DATA INTEGRITY CHECKS FOR THE PREDICTED INCOME SCORE (PANEL A) AND BIRTHWEIGHT (PANEL B) 
 
Notes: Panel A reports the frequency distribution of the income score and a smoothed kernel density estimator on either side of the threshold with the associated confidence interval. Panel B presents a 
histogram of birthweights in our sample, as recorded in the Uruguay vital statistics system data. 
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APPENDIX FIGURE A8— BALANCE TEST: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COVARIATES AND THE PANES PREDICTED INCOME SCORE 
Notes: The figure reports residuals from a regression of each variable on the controls, as in Table A6 (i.e., on month of baseline survey indicator variables and month of conception indicators, depending 
on the variable) as a function of the income score, in multiples of 0.002.  Estimated quadratic regression lines on either side of the threshold plus 95 percent confidence intervals also reported. See also 
notes to Table A6.  
  
 
 
 
APPENDIX FIGURE A8 — BALANCE TEST: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COVARIATES AND THE PANES PREDICTED INCOME SCORE (CONTINUED) 
 
  
 
 
 
APPENDIX FIGURE A8— BALANCE TEST: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COVARIATES AND THE PANES PREDICTED INCOME SCORE (CONTINUED) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
A: Fraction of children whose household was ever 
treated, as a function of date of birth relative to date 
of baseline survey visit  
B: Fertilty rate as a function of (imputed) time 
to/since first income transfer by PANES eligibility 
status 
 
  
  
C: Fertilty rate as a function of (imputed) time 
to/since first income transfer by PANES eligibility 
status - no children before the program 
D: Fertilty rate as a function of (imputed) time 
to/since first income transfer by PANES eligibility 
status – one child before the program 
E: Fertilty rate as a function of (imputed) time 
to/since first income transfer by PANES eligibility 
status - two or more children before the program 
   
 
APPENDIX FIGURE A9— FERTILITY RATES AND FRACTION TREATED AS A FUNCTION OF TIME TO/SINCE KEY PROGRAM DATES 
 
Notes: Panel A reports the fraction of children of applicant mothers whose household ever benefitted from the program as a function of the child’s day of birth relative to the day of the baseline survey. 
Panel B reports the fraction of mothers giving birth as a function of the time before/after the month of first program payment, separately for PANES eligible and PANES ineligible women, in the range (-
0.1, 0.1) around the eligibility threshold. Panels C, D and E report the same series as in Panel B separately by number of children born between January 2003 and the baseline survey. 
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Appendix B: PANES Program components 
 
The program also contained a variety of other minor components. Around 15 percent of PANES 
households had one member attending training and educational activities organized by local NGOs 
(Rutas de Salida) with the aim of fostering social inclusion by recovering the lost work habits of 
participants, promoting knowledge of rights, strengthening social ties and, in some cases, 
promoting good health and nutrition practices. Around 16 percent of PANES households had one 
member participating in a workfare program (Trabajo por Uruguay). Some participants were also 
incentivized to undergo routine medical checks (smear tests, prenatal visits and mammography for 
women and prostate exam for men) and were offered dental care and prostheses and eye surgery. 
Households in the treatment group received the monthly income provided they were not involved 
in public works employment (Trabajo por Uruguay), which paid a monthly salary of UY$2,720 
in lieu of the cash transfer. Participation in this employment scheme was voluntary and, among 
households who applied for jobs, participants were selected by lottery. In the paper we define 
program beneficiaries those receiving either the Ingreso Ciudadano (Citizen Income, the cash 
transfer) or Trabajo por Uruguay. As of spring 2007, nearly all eligible households declared 
having received the cash transfer at some point during the program, 71 percent reported having 
received the Food Card while only a minority (17.6 percent) benefited from public works 
employment. Additional components of the PANES program included: regularization of 
beneficiaries’ connection to public utilities networks (water and electricity) for a nominal fee, in-
kind transfers of building materials for home improvements; health care including free dental and 
eye care (e.g., cataract surgery performed in Cuba) and prostheses; micro-finance loans and 
technical assistance for small entrepreneurial activities; and temporary accommodation for 
homeless households. Overall, around 13 percent of beneficiary households reported having 
received at least one of these additional components. PANES also encompassed schooling and 
health investments (additional school teachers in disadvantaged neighborhoods and public health 
investments). These affected beneficiary and non-beneficiary households equally. Although an 
emergency health plan (Plan de Emergencia Sanitaria) was also originally conceived as an integral 
part of PANES, this was not de facto implemented. 
 
 
